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1 Introduction
Suppose you are about to purchase a laptop, worth $1000. A shop offers it with a loan
option which lets you to pay it off in two equal installments of $500 each. An other shop
offers you the same item with two different possible ways to pay for: either of two equal-size
installments of $500 each (same as the first shop’s offer), or a decreasing installments of
$750 and $250, respectively. Assuming you would purchase the laptop at the first shop,
would you buy it at the second shop if you happened to see their offer first? Based on
the classical discounted utility model, rational decision-makers would consider the second
shop’s offer at least as good as the first’s one. That is, if one would choose to purchase the
item based on the first shop’s offer, she would definitely purchase it when she is faced with
the options offered by the second shop.
However, a growing body of evidence from laboratory and field experiments suggests
that this might not necessarily be the case. Provocative examples are presented for example
in Schkade and Kahneman (1998) or in Dunn et al. (2003). In these articles the authors find
strong support for the observation that decision-makers when faced with multi-dimensional
decisions tend to overweight few attributes of a decision relative to the others leading to
counterintuitive results.1
Disproportionate weighting of attributes has been intensely researched and the notion
recently was formalized for both risky decisions (Bordalo et al., 2012a) and intertemporal
choices (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013).2 The main assumption in these models is that people
tend to assign greater weight to the importance of an attribute in which their alternatives
differ more.3 While the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) shows obvious similarities to
the one presented in Bordalo et al. (2012a,b, 2013a,b, 2014) it assumes a weight function
which is not option-specific in contrast to the option-specific characterisation suggested by
Bordalo et al. and thus it is more suitable to draw welfare conclusions and regulatory
implications. The model builds on a time-separable utility function where each attribute
1More related examples can be found in Huber et al. (1982), Simonson (1989), Tversky and Simonson
(1993) or Roelofsma and Read (2000). For a detailed review of related experimental findings see for
example Camerer et al. (2004). More recently, Bertrand et al. (2010) presented field experiment evidence
about how context specific information changes the decision-maker’s behaviour.
2For earlier works on this literature see Tversky (1969), Tversky and Simonson (1993), González-Vallejo
et al. (1996), Roelofsma and Read (2000), González-Vallejo (2002), Scholten and Read (2010) or
González-Vallejo et al. (2012).
3These approaches have been successful in explaining a range of puzzling observations in different fields
of economic decisions. More specifically, the model of Bordalo and his colleagues can account for the decoy
effect (Bordalo et al., 2013a), the endowment effect (Bordalo et al., 2012b) the anchoring effect (Bordalo et
al., 2014), provides an explanation on how salience leads to a transformation of objective probabilities into
probability weights (Bordalo et al., 2012a) and explains several puzzles associated with asset prices (Bordalo
et al., 2013b). Furthermore, the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) explains time-inconsistent behavior,
both present bias and overcommitment to future goals at the same time, price sensitivity in health decisions
(Abaluck, 2011), loan financing without budget constraints (Bertaut et al., 2009; Stango and Zinman, 2009)
and lump-sum preferences compared to annuity in retirement and health decisions (Brown et al., 2008).
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measures the consumption in a given time period and welfare is defined as the sum of the
utilities of the respective consumption. In this framework the decision-maker maximizes
her focus-weighted utility based on which the utility of a time period is weighted with
a focus function. This framework, however, does not specify the focus function in the
presence of discounting and such its applicability is somewhat limited in cases when time
is an important factor of the decision.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of focusing on loan decisions.
We extend the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and make the framework more suitable for
analyzing intertemporal decisions by introducing discounting and consider a more general
case of the model of focusing. We analyze two different specifications of the focus function:
decision-makers either focus on the nominal values or on the discounted values of the utility.
We show that a decision-maker’s disproportionate focus on the initial benefit a loan entails
(e.g. when receiving money or a purchased good) can lead to decisions which yield negative
consumption utility.4 However, as we will show in this paper this can be counterbalanced
by introducing a specific alternative repayment schedule. In particular, we claim that the
introduction of a decreasing-installments plan in addition to an existing fixed-installments
plan makes the decision-maker less likely to take out loans which would yield her negative
utility. That is, adding well designed new alternatives to the choice-set decreases the bias
towards taking out harmful loans and as a consequence increases welfare. This might have
important implications for policy making regarding loan consumption. We also find that
even tough decreasing repayment plans have a positive effect on loan decisions they are
always dominated by fixed-installment plans. This latter result is consistent with the em-
pirical data in Cox et al. (2015) which suggest that decreasing repayment plans (e.g., equal
principal repayment plan) are the least frequently chosen instruments in the loan market
when other plans are also available to the consumers. Furthermore, we show that in some
specific cases the introduction of an increasing-installments plan can further increase the
focusing bias. This effect may contribute to the popularity of alternative mortgages, which
gained a large market share both in the US and Europe (see Demyanyk and Hemert, 2011;
Cox et al., 2015). One may argue that this is due to their lower initial installments, which
might be especially attractive for borrowers with low income or poor credit scores, who
do not have alternative options. However, empirical data do not support this explanation.
The average annual household income for borrowers does not differ across mortgage types
as it was reported by Cocco (2013), Amromin et al. (2011) or Cox et al. (2015). Based on
the theory presented in this paper we argue that the popularity of alternative mortgages
might be because of their strong focusing bias.
In what follows we present our model, derive its propositions and finally interpret our
results.
4This result is in line with the empirical observation that people tend to underestimate the burden of a
loan (Hoelzl et al., 2009; Akers, 2014).
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2 The Model
Let the consumption choice-set be given by a finite set C ⊂ RT+1, where T > 1. Adapt-
ing the framework of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) we assume that the consumer maximizes
her focus-weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 gtut(ct), where gt ≡ g(maxc ut(ct) −
minc ut(ct)) is a focus-weight of period (attribute) t with g(·) a positive, strictly increasing
function. However, by consuming c = (c0, c1, . . . cT ) ∈ C the decision-maker realizes her
consumption-based utility of U(c) =
∑T
t=0 ut(ct).
In order to make the model more specific and relevant to intertemporal choices, we in-
troduce discounting and consider focus-weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 δ(t)gtut(ct),
where δ(t) : N → (0, 1] is the common discount function and it is assumed to be decreas-
ing. Furthermore, we consider consumption-based utility or personal welfare as U(c) =∑T
t=0 δ(t)ut(ct). It is important to note that with this specification of the focus-weights the
decision-maker’s focus is based on the nominal values rather than on discounted values of
the utilities. In section 3 we will show the consequences of the model when the focus-weights
are defined on the discounted values.
First we will consider the case of exponential discounting, i.e. δ(t) = δt. Then, in section
6 we will discuss the robustness of the results for more general δ(t) discount functions.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 ut(ct) = ct
Assumption 2 0 ∈ C
Assumption 3 (L,−x, . . . ,−x) ∈ C
These assumptions are not restricting the explanatory power of the model in any relevant
case. As it is shown by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) the model remains valid for any arbitrary
functional form of the focus function. By assuming linear utility functions we follow the
literature in this regard and assume that the utility function is a money metric measure.
Furthermore, we assume that the loan free status-quo is always in the choice-set, that is, not
taking out a loan is always an option for the decision-maker. Since the fixed-installments
plan is the most typical observed loan in practice we assume that the flat plan as a possible
repayment plan is always available in the choice-set.
Now, consider the following two consumption profiles: cA = (L,−x,−x, . . . ,−x) where
L, x ≥ 0 and c0 = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0). One can think of cA as a loan with fixed-installments
(i.e., flat plan or annuity) and c0 as the loan-free status-quo.5
5Notice that we do not restrict our analysis to the case of fair loans only. Throughout the analysis a loan
is considered in the most general way as a consumption profile, which can yield negative or non-negative
utility to the consumer.
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Based on the aforementioned framework, a consumer is going to choose cA instead of
c0, whenever U(cA) ≥ U(c0), i.e when:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ 0 (1)
Note, however, that consuming cA could lead to a negative consumption utility, while
(1) is still satisfied. To illustrate that this might be the case, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct), with cA and c0 as
follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 600 600 600
In this case the consumer chooses cA, since U(cA) = 1000 · 1000 − 0.9 · 600 · 600 − 0.92 ·
600 · 600− 0.93 · 600 · 600 = 121960 > 0, however, cA yields a consumption-based utility of
U(cA) = 1000− 0.9 · 600− 0.92 · 600− 0.93 · 600 = −463.4 < 0. Hence, a consumer focusing
on the closer-to-the-present attributes may be tempted to choose a consumption profile which
yields a negative utility for her.
Assumption 4 xt < L for t = 1, . . . , T
We assume that all installments are strictly smaller than the lump-sum value, that is, we
assume that a loan is always paid back in several installments.
Definition 1 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the fair lump-sum value
(LW ) is the value for which the consumption-based utility of the loan is zero, i.e., u0(LW )+∑T
t=1 δ
tut(ct) = 0.
Definition 2 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the fair focus-weighted
utility lump-sum value (LFWU ) is the value for which the focus-weighted utility of the loan
is zero, i.e., g(LFWU )u0(LFWU ) +
∑T
t=1 δ
tgtut(ct) = 0.
Proposition 1 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the decision-maker is
always willing to accept a lower lump-sum value based on her focus-weighted utility than
based on her consumption utility, i.e. LFWU < LW .
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Proof: Since gtg(LFWU ) ∈ (0, 1) we have that
T∑
t=1
δt
gt
g(LFWU )
ut(ct) >
T∑
t=1
δtut(ct)
or LFWU < LW 
This proposition indicates that it is always possible to create a loan contract which
seems to be beneficial for the decision-maker even though it yields negative utility for her.
Definition 3 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the focusing bias in loan
decisions (B) is the difference between the fair lump-sum values, i.e., B = LW − LFWU
To examine the effects of focusing, let us introduce one more consumption profile: cB =
(L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ), where xi ≤ xj whenever i ≥ j and xt ≥ 0, (i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} and
t = 1, 2, . . . , T ). We assume that
∑T
t=1 δ
txt =
∑T
t=1 δ
tx, where x refers to the installments
of cA.6 One can think of cB as a decreasing loan repayment plan with a present value equal
as cA. In this case, the consumer’s maximization problem can be written as:
max
c
U(c) for c ∈ {c0, cA, cB}. (2)
Proposition 2 Introducing a decreasing loan repayment plan in addition to a flat repay-
ment plan decreases the focus-weighted utility of the flat plan.
Proof: Let k ≡ min{i|xi ≤ x}. If x1 ≥ x and xT ≤ x, then k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} is well
defined, as it is the case for loan repayment plans. We shall prove that:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x−
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x (3)
−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ −
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x
which is equivalent to
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(xt)− g(x)]x ≥ 0 (4)
6Notice, that we do not restrict our attention to alternatives with the same duration as the original plan.
Throughout the analysis we allow alternative repayment plans to have shorter duration than the flat plan
as far as their present value is the same. In this regard, periods with no installments should be considered
as periods with xt = 0.
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Since g(·) is a positive, strictly increasing function and δ > 0, this inequality holds if
x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, which is the case by definition. Moreover, if x1 > x then the (4) holds as
strict inequality. 
Remark 1 Notice that Proposition 2 holds not only when a decreasing installments plan is
introduced, but also when any other type of loan repayment plan is added to the choice-set in
addition to the flat plan. This is because in the periods when the flat installment is greater
then the alternative one the actual focus will be determined by the flat plan and hence can
be eliminated, while in those periods when the installment of the alternative plan is higher
relative to the flat installment than the assigned focus is also going to be greater. Thus,
inequality (4) holds for any type of equivalent repayment plan. Furthermore, with a similar
argument one can easily show that the same is true if the loan originally is offered with an
increasing-installments plan rather than with a flat plan.
Proposition 2 yields an interesting result. If the consumer’s profile-set consists only of
cA and c0, she chooses cA, whenever (1) is satisfied. Yet, if cB is part of the set as well,
she may prefer c0. To demonstrate this, consider the next example.
Example 2 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) again and the consump-
tion profiles as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
cB 1000 -780 -670 -300
gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 780 670 600
In this case U(cA) = 1000 ·1000−0.9 ·780 ·600−0.92 ·670 ·600−0.93 ·600 ·600 = −9260 < 0,
U(c0) = 0 and U(cB) = 1000 · 1000 − 0.9 · 780 · 780 − 0.92 · 670 · 670 − 0.93 · 600 · 300 =
−42389 < 0. Therefore the optimal choice is c0.
Furthermore:
Proposition 3 If C = {c0, cA, cB}, then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan are
both available to a consumer, then the former is always preferred.
Proof: We shall prove that:
g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x−
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≥ g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)xt −
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)xt (5)
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Define yi ≡ xi − x. Note that yi ≥ 0 if i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and yi ≤ 0 otherwise. Thus
(5) can be written as:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)x+
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)(x+ yt) +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)(x+ yt)
This simplifies to:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)yt (6)
or
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt + g(x)
T∑
t=k
δtyt (7)
Since
∑T
t=1 δ
tx =
∑T
t=1 δ
t(x + yt), we have that
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0. Using this, (7) can be
written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt − g(x)
k−1∑
t=1
δtyt
that is
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(x+ yt)− g(x)]yt (8)
As yt > 0 for t = 1, 2, . . . , k−1 and g(·) is strictly positive and increasing by definition, this
inequality always holds. Moreover, the inequality is strict whenever ∃s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1}
for which ys > 0, in other words when cA 6= cB. 
Remark 2 Proposition 3 holds even if cB is not a decreasing but any other type of loan
repayment plan. In this case, inequality (7) can be rewritten as 0 ≤ ∑t∈K δtg(x + yt)yt +
g(x)
∑
t/∈K δ
tyt, where K is the set of indices for which the non-flat installment is higher
than the respective repayment of the flat schedule.
Proposition 4 Introducing any type of repayment plan in addition to a fixed-installments
plan decreases the focusing bias B.
Proof: According to Proposition 2 introducing an alternative equivalent repayment plan
makes the fixed-installment plan less attractive and LFWU increases compared to the orig-
inal setting. Thus, by introducing a new repayment plan the LFWU is increasing while the
LW does not change. As a consequence, the focusing bias B decreases. 
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Proposition 5 Introducing any number of decreasing (increasing) repayment plans in ad-
dition to a fixed-install-ments plan decreases the focusing bias B.
Proof: Let the set of those periods in which at least one of the alternative repayment
plans’ relevant installment is greater than the fixed installment be K, i.e., K ≡ {t|xt >
x for any c ∈ C}. Since the focus weights in these periods are determined by the maximum
effective installments, it follows that these are bigger that the weights effective when only
the flat plan is available. However, in those periods, when the installment of any alternative
plan is equal or smaller then the fixed installment the focus-weight is determined by the
fixed installment. More formally, gt = g(maxc xt) if t ∈ K and gt = g(x) otherwise.
Counterposing the two focus-weighted utility of the flat plan, we can eliminate all those
periods’ utilities where the focus-weight is similar, i.e., when t ∈ T \ K. The remaining
periods are all characterized by greater focus-weights than the weights effective when only
the flat plan is available, since gt(·) = g(maxc xt) > g(x) if t ∈ K by definition. It follows
that the focus-weighted utility of the flat plan is smaller when the flat plan is coupled with
alternative repayment plans relative to the case when it is the only available repayment
plan. In other words, coupling the flat plan with alternative repayment plans decreases the
LFWU of the flat plan. Thus, if it happens that the consumer prefers the flat plan over all
the alternatives then the focusing bias B is decreasing following the introduction of new
repayment plans.
If, however, at least one alternative dominates the flat plan the consumer would prefer
to choose the loan with an alternative repayment rather than with the fixed-installments
plan. Let the set of alternatives with the highest focus-weighted utility given that all
alternatives are available be D. More formally, let D = {d ∈ C|d % c,∀c ∈ C}. Take an
element of this set, say d˜. We know that the LFWU of d˜ is strictly greater than the LFWU
of the fixed-installments plan when there are only these two repayment plans available in
addition to the status-quo. We also know that the LFWU of d˜ is getting greater as new
alternatives are added to the choice-set, since the effective focus-weights are never getting
smaller but potentially greater with the introduction of new repayment plans. However,
since the consumer prefers d˜ over any other repayment plans, the LFWU of d˜ should be the
lowest when all alternatives are available. Yet, as we have shown, this later LFWU is greater
than the LFWU of the fixed-installments plan when the choice-set consist only of these two
repayment plans apart from the status-quo. Consequently, the LFWU of d˜ is always higher
than LFWU of the fixed-installments plan in the original setting. Since we have chosen
d arbitrarily it follows that the argument holds for all d ∈ D. As a consequence, the
introduction of new repayment plans decreases the focusing bias B. 
Our results suggest that introducing a new repayment plan increases the LFWU of a flat
plan. One might argue that this may possibly deter the decision-maker from taking out a
loan which potentially would result in positive consumption utility. This, however, cannot
be the case. Whenever the consumption utility of a loan is positive the focus-weighted
9
utility of it is also positive. More formally:
Proposition 6 If U(c) > 0, then U(c) > 0 also holds. To show this consider the following.
The focus-weighted utility of c = (L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ) can be written as
g0L− δg1x1 − δ2g2x2 − · · · − gT δTxT
where gt is the focus-weight of period t. Since xi < L (i = 1, . . . , T ), we have that g0 ≥ gt
for any t = 1, . . . , T . Thus
g0L−δg1x1−δ2g2x2−· · ·−gT δTxT ≥ g0L−δg0x1−δ2g0x2−· · ·−g0δTxT = g0(L−
T∑
t=1
δtxt)
Yet, this is always positive, since U(c) > 0 and g0 > 0.
3 Focus-weights based on discounted values
So far, we considered cases with focus-weights based on nominal values of the repayment
plans. Let us now examine our results when focusing is based on discounted values, that is,
when gt ≡ g(δt(maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct))). In the following we will show that if we define
focus-weights in terms of discounted values Proposition 2 to 5 still hold for decreasing-
installment plans, although not necessarily for other alternative plans such as increasing-
installment plans.
Proposition 7 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values of the utilities,
introducing a decreasing loan repayment schedule makes a flat plan less attractive for the
consumer.
Proof: In this case (4) changes to:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtxt)x−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtx)x ≥ 0 (9)
Since x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, g(·) positive and strictly increasing, while δ ∈ (0, 1] this inequality
always holds. 
Remark 3 Note that Proposition 7 holds not only for decreasing plans but for any other
type of loan repayment schedule. Moreover, the same is true for an increasing-installments
plan when it is coupled with new alternatives. To see this, one can use the same technic
presented in Remark 1.
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Proposition 8 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values and C =
{c0, cA, cB} then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan are both available to a
consumer, then the former is always preferred.
Proof: In this case (6) can be written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt (10)
Notice that
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δtx)yt is always negative, since yt < 0 for any t = k, . . . , T . That is,
by replacing δt with δk for each t = k, . . . , T , we have that the right-hand side of (10) is
never lower than
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt. Hence:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt ≥
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt (11)
The right-hand side of (11) can be written as
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x + yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
∑T
t=k δ
tyt
and since
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0, this equals to
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x + yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
∑k−1
t=1 −δtyt or∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+yt))yt−
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δkx)yt This, however, can be written as
∑k−1
t=1 δ
t[g(δt(x+
yt)) − g(δkx)]yt As y1, . . . , yk−1 ≥ 0 and g(·) is positive and strictly increasing, this latter
expression is always non-negative, that is, (11) always holds, and as a consequence (10) is
always true. 
Proposition 8 is not necessarily true if cB is not a decreasing repayment plan, but for
instance, an increasing one. To illustrate this consider the following example.
Example 3 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9, gt = δt[maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct)] and the consumption
profiles be as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
cC 1000 -542 -602 -669
maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 600 602 669
gt 1000 540 487.62 487.7
In this case U(cA) = 1000·1000−0.9·540·600−0.92·487.62·600−0.93·487.7·600 = 258096.26,
U(c0) = 0 and U(cC) = 1000 · 1000− 0.9 · 540 · 542− 0.92 · 487.62 · 602− 0.93 · 487.7 · 669 =
260962.47. Therefore the optimal choice is cC.
We summarize this in the following:
11
Proposition 9 In case of focusing on discounted values the welfare effect of introducing a
repayment plan is ambiguous, however, introducing a decreasing repayment plan still pro-
vides welfare improvement.
Remark 4 Notice that for the propositions to hold we don’t need a real decreasing-install-
ments plan in the sense that xi ≥ xj whenever i ≥ j, we only need a repayment plan with
a k for which xi > x if i < k and xi ≤ x, otherwise.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that Proposition 6 remains valid with discounted focus-
weights as well.
4 The effect of focusing on loans with prepayment options
One may wonder how the results presented in the previous sections are affected by the
possibility of loan prepayments. Let us assume that borrowers do have the option to pay
their loans off before their maturity. Yet, prepaying the loan, say in period s = 1, . . . , T −1,
borrowers may face a prepayment penalty of ηs ≥ 0, which can be either a lump-sum fee
or a sum based on a percentage of the remaining balance of the loan.7 Thus, a borrower
who would pay the loan off in period s would be characterized with the consumption
profile of cpres = (L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xs−1,−
∑T
t=s δ
t−sxt − ηs, 0, . . . , 0).8 Notice, that these
prepayment options extend the choice-set with T − 1 new elements for each consumption-
profile. In general, for a choice c ∈ C, the following options are available if prepayment is
possible:
t 0 1 2 . . . T-1 T
c L −x1 −x2 . . . −xT−1 −xT
cpreT−1 L −x1 −x2 . . . −
∑T
t=T−1 δ
t−(T−1)xt − ηT−1 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
cpre1 L −
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1xt − η1 0 . . . 0 0
To see how the previous results are affected by the prepayment options available to the
borrowers consider Proposition 2 first. In this case the focus-weights for each period are
determined solely by the flat plan (more precisely by the present value of the remaining
balance of the flat plan in the respective period plus the prepayment penalty), and the
decreasing installments plan plays no role in this regard. This is because with a decreasing-
installments plan one always pays off more of the loan in the first few periods than with
the flat plan, i.e. the remaining balance of the flat plan is always greater than that of
7Prepayment penalties are often used in order to protect lenders against the financial loss of paid interest
over time.
8Here we assume that ηs is a lump-sum fee, however, all our results remain valid with the penalty which
is based on a percentage of the remaining balance of the loan.
12
the decreasing plan. Thus, if the borrower has the option to pay her loan off in any
period, inequality (4) holds.9 That is, Proposition 2 is valid even if prepayment options are
available.
Proposition 3 holds as well if prepayment of the loan is an option. The reason for this
is that the focus-weights are decreasing over time, as the remaining balance of the flat plan
is getting smaller and smaller. Therefore, the greatest installments of the decreasing plan
are overweighted, which makes the decreasing-installments plan less appealing compared to
the flat plan. More formally, in Proposition 3 inequality (6) modifies to:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg
(
T∑
s=t
δs−1x+ ηs
)
yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg
(
T∑
s=k
δT−sx+ ηs
)
yt (12)
Let us replace the focus-weights for each periods of t ≥ k with the greatest weight of this
interval, i.e. with the focus-weight of the remaining balance of the flat plan in period k. As
yt ≤ 0 if t ≥ k and the remaining balance of the flat plan is decreasing in each subsequent
period inequality (12) holds if the following is true:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg
(
T∑
s=t
δs−1x+ ηs
)
yt + g
(
T∑
s=k
δT−sx+ ηs
)
T∑
t=k
δtyt (13)
After similar transformations as in the proof of Proposition 3, this can be rewritten as
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δt
[
g
(
T∑
s=t
δs−1x+ ηs
)
− g
(
T∑
s=k
δT−sx+ ηs
)]
yt. (14)
As the focus-weights are strictly decreasing and yt ≥ 0 if t < k this inequality always holds.
Thus, Proposition 3 remains valid even when prepayment options are available. Moreover,
since Proposition 2 and 3 hold it follows that Proposition 4 and 5 are true as well. The
proof of Proposition 7-9 goes along the same lines.
One result, though, which does not remain valid if prepayment options are available
is Proposition 6. When the focus-weights are large enough the focus-weighted utility of
a repayment plan can become negative, even though the decision-maker would benefit
from taking out the loan with the respective repayment plan. As the following example
illustrates a consumption profile with positive consumption-based utility can have negative
focus-weighted utility when prepayment is possible.
Example 4 Let T = 3, δ = 0.8, ηt = 200, gt = [maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct)] and the
consumption profiles be as follows:
9Notice that, if the prepayment option is available only from the second period, i.e. s > 1, inequality
(4) holds for strict inequality. This is because, in this case (4) can be rewritten as δ[g(x1) − g(x)]x +∑T
t=2 δ
t
[
g
(∑T
t=2 δ
t−2x+ ηt
)
− g
(∑T
t=2 δ
t−2x+ ηt
)]
x ≥ 0. Since the first part of this inequality is strictly
positive and the second part equals to zero the inequality always holds.
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0. 1. 2. 3.
c 1000 -500 -500 -500
cpre1 1000 -1420 0 0
cpre2 1000 -500 -1100 0
c0 0 0 0 0
gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 1420 1100 500
In this case U(c) = −48000 and U(c0) = 0. Therefore the optimal choice is c0, however,
taking out the loan would be beneficial, since U(c) = 24 > 0.
Interestingly, the availability of the prepayment option has a similar reducing effect on
focusing bias as coupling a repayment plan with a more decreasing plan does. As we have
shown the prepayment option increases the focus-weight of each period, therefore the focus-
weighted utility of any repayment plan consequently decreases. Moreover, if prepayment
penalties are being used, the focusing bias is going to be even smaller as the penalties
further increase the focus-weights. In fact prepayment penalties could be used to totally
eliminate the focusing bias the decision-maker is facing in loan decisions. If prepayment
penalties in each period would be set in such a way that the focus-weighted utility of the
loan would equal the consumption-based utility of it, then the focusing bias caused by the
disproportionate weights would disappear. Therefore, from a welfare-perspective, we define
the optimal prepayment penalty in the following way:
Definition 4 For each consumption profile the optimal prepayment penalty vector, ηopts =
(ηopt1 , η
opt
2 , . . . , η
opt
T−1), is a vector of lump-sum fees a decision-maker has to pay in case
of prepayment for which the focus-weighted utility of the consumption profile equals its
consumption-based utility, i.e. is the solution of the following equation:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg
(
T∑
s=t
δs−1x+ ηopts
)
xt − ηopts = L−
T∑
t=1
δtxt
To determine the optimal penalties, one should know the functional form of g(·).10 This,
however, is private information and not readily available for the social planner. Without
this information it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine optimal prepayment penalties
and one should bare in mind that poorly adjusted prepayment penalties can dissuade the
decision-makers from taking out loans which would be beneficial for them. In light of this
it is important to emphasize the effectiveness of the mechanism discussed in this paper. By
coupling a repayment plan with a more decreasing-installments plan one can reduce the
focusing bias without jeopardising the borrowing of loans with positive utility. Moreover,
this mechanism is easy to implement and comes with negligible or no cost whatsoever.
10If prepayment penalties are constant over time, i.e. ηopts = η for every s = 1, . . . , T − 1 as it is often
the case, the optimal prepayment penalty is unique, yet to determine this penalty the same information is
needed as in the general case.
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On the other hand, these penalties may not be optimal for the lenders. From the lenders’
perspective the optimal penalty would be a penalty vector which secures them against the
financial loss of the paid interest in case of prepayment. Yet, these penalties, and as a
matter of fact any positive penalty, would have the unintended consequence of increasing
the focus-weights which may discourage decision-makers from taking out loans which may
have negative impact on the lender’s profit. Because of these conflicting effects a lender
might be better off if borrowers would not consider the available prepayment options as
feasible which is in line with the empirical findings of Lacko and Pappalardo (2010).
5 The effect of a possible default on focusing
Borrowers may default on their loans. This might be the result of a strategic behavior, i.e.
when the borrower does have the ability to continue paying off the loan, but stops making
payments. For example, in case of a mortgage if the property’s value drops below the debt
still owned, the borrower may prefer to default on the loan.11 Moreover, a borrower may
become unable to meet her obligation of repayments as a result of an unseen event. In
this section we revisit our results by assuming that decision-makers take into account the
possibility of defaulting on their loans. Formally, we assume that borrowers expect an event
when default is unavoidable or strategically desirable to occur with a probability 0 < ζ < 1.
Let us further assume that by defaulting on the loan a borrower would face a cost of D > 0
that includes all potential costs related to the default (e.g. legal costs, fines, etc.) above
the debt still owned by the borrower.12
When default may happen with positive probability the payoffs, zt, are calculated as
the expected value of each periods’ installments and the cost of default. More formally,
zt = (1− ζ)t−1
[
(1− ζ)xt + ζ
(∑T
l=t δ
l−txl +D
)]
.To demonstrate how the possibility of a
default affects the focus-weights, consider the following example, in which we assume that
the decision-maker takes out a loan for three periods with a flat plan.
Example 5 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9, ζ = 0.1, D = 100, xt = 600, gt = [maxc ut(ct) −
minc ut(ct)] and the consumption profiles be as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -650 -585 -526.5
c0 0 0 0 0
maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 650 585 526.5
As this example illustrates the possibility of default makes a flat plan effectively a decreas-
ing plan. As a result, coupling a flat plan with a consumption-based utility equivalent
decreasing plan, all our propositions remain valid as we will show in the followings.
11Strategic default is possible only with non-recourse loans, when the debt is secured only with the
collateral, and in the case of default the lender is not allowed to collect the borrower’s other assets.
12Here we are focusing on recourse loans, yet our results hold for non-recourse loans as well.
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Consider Proposition 2. Notice, that the decreasing plan’s first period expected install-
ment is greater than the flat plan’s expected installment, since (1 − ζ)x1+
ζ
(∑T
l=1 δ
l−1xl +D
)
> (1 − ζ)x + ζ
(∑T
l=1 δ
l−1x+D
)
always holds. Furthermore, since
(1−ζ)T−1 [(1− ζ)xT + ζ (xT +D)] < (1−ζ)T−1 [(1− ζ)x+ ζ (x+D)], the opposite is true
for the last period. From this follows that there is a well defined period (k′ ≡ min{i|z(d)i ≤
z
(f)
i }, where z(j)i is the expected installment of plan j in period i), similar to k in the proof
of Proposition 2, for which inequality (4) always holds, i.e. Proposition 2 remains true if
one considers the possibility of default.
Proposition 3 also holds when the default has a positive probability. The proof goes
along the same lines as in Proposition 3. Applying the same transformations, the proof
simplifies to
∑k′−1
t=1 δ
t
[
g
(
z
(d)
t
)
− g
(
z
(f)
k′
)]
y′t ≥ 0, where y′t ≡ z(d)t − z(f)t , which inequality
always holds. Therefore, we can conclude that the flat repayment plan is always preferred
to a decreasing repayment plan even if defaulting on a loan may happen with a positive
probability. Since Proposition 2 and 3 hold it follows that Proposition 4 and 5 are also
true. One can use the same logic to prove Proposition 7-9.
Finally, Proposition 6 holds when the default on the loan has a positive probability if
z1 ≤ L,. More specifically
(1− ζ)x1 + ζ
(
T∑
t=1
δt−1xt +D
)
≤ L
or
ζD ≤ L− x1 − ζ
(
T∑
t=2
δt−1xt − x1
)
a rather unrestrictive condition, which is often satisfied in reality.13 That is, if the cost
and/or the probability of default is sufficiently low, then a consumer will always take out a
loan with positive utility since its focus-weighted utility cannot become negative even when
the possibility of default is taken into account.
6 Discussion
So far we have assumed that decision-makers use exponential discounting, thus, we have
posited that the discount rate is constant over time. However, that might not necessarily
be the case. Many studies suggest that people tend to be present biased and this behavior
13For example, assuming that the probability of default of a fair loan with flat repayment plan of 10
periods is 10% it would require an unlikely high default cost of roughly eight times greater than the loan
to violate this condition.
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may be characterized with declining rather than constant discount rates.14 The discount
function with a declining discount rate is usually referred to as hyperbolic discount function.
Since analytically it would be difficult to deal with the hyperbolic discount function we
assume quasi-hyperbolic discounting in order to analyze the effect of focusing when decision-
makers are present biased and assume that δ(t) = βδt, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter
for present bias and δ ∈ (0, 1]. As it was shown by Laibson (1997) the quasi-hyperbolic
discount function captures the qualitative properties of the hyperbolic discount function,
yet maintains the analytical tractability of the exponential discount function.15 In this
regard we can state the following:
Proposition 10 Our results remain valid in the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Proof: Using βδt instead of δt the relevant expressions increase β-fold. By dividing them
with β we obtain exactly the same inequalities we derived in the proofs of the previous
sections. 
Even though the effects of hyperbolic discounting might look similar to the focusing bias
(in both cases the decision-maker weights the present consumption disproportionately, i.e.
is present biased), they are very different phenomena. In order to understand this consider
a hyperbolic decision-maker with no focusing bias. This decision-maker might prefer a
loan with a decreasing-installments plan over a flat repayment plan since with hyperbolic
discounting the periods near the present are more heavily discounted. Yet, this cannot
happen with focusing bias as we have shown in Proposition 3 and Proposition 8.
Independent from the specification of the focusing function, our results suggest that
introducing a decreasing repayment plan decreases the focusing bias. In other words, a
loan always seems less attractive when a new decreasing plan is introduced in addition
to the original plan and as a consequence the focusing bias B = LW − LFWU decreases.
Interestingly, the presence of the decreasing repayment plan affects only the focusing bias,
but not the decision-maker’s optimal choice in the sense that if the decision-maker chooses
to take out the loan she will prefer the flat plan over the decreasing one. These results
remain valid even if borrowers have the possibility to prepay their loans or when they take
the default choice into account. Importantly, under reasonable assumptions the decrease
of the focusing bias caused by the introduction of new decreasing repayment plans cannot
deter any decision-maker from taking out a loan which delivers them positive consumption
utility, it only affects harmful loan consumptions.
From a policy standpoint, one may wonder what the practical consequences of the ex-
istence of focusing bias are. In this regard our results indicate that lenders may have a
strong, intended or unintended, influence on borrowers’ decisions just by offering them
the loans with specific repayment plans. As we have shown, a loan presented with a re-
payment plan featured with great focusing bias may incentivize consumption of the loan
14See e.g. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Camerer et al. (2004), Thaler (2005), Berns et al. (2007).
15For more on quasi-hyperbolic discounting see Laibson (1997).
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even if that may result in negative utility. This, however, might be counterbalanced by
the mechanism presented in this paper. Based on our results we conjecture that adding
a decreasing-installments plan to the choice-set will make decision-makers less likely to
take out loans which yield them negative utility without affecting their attitude towards
the ones with positive utility. Yet, we argue that people would still prefer to choose the
fixed-installments plan from this extended choice-set. Moreover, we claim that by exploit-
ing the aforementioned effect of focus, people might make more deliberate loan decisions.
If banks, for example, would present a loan in fixed- and decreasing-installments options,
they could end up getting more prudent decisions from their clients. This obviously boils
down to policy making. Namely, a policy could prescribe that financial institutions present
a loan repayment schedule also in a decreasing-installment option, and not only in a fixed-
or increasing-installment one. The induced focus on the decreasing-installments plan could
dampen the increased focus on getting the loan, thereby discouraging decision-makers from
taking out loans which might yield them negative utility. This may be especially impor-
tant in the case of loans with increasing-intallments plans (e.g. mortgages with initial
’teaser’ rates), since these instruments could generate the highest focusing bias, and as a
consequence, may motivate harmful loan consumption the most.
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